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have built networks that run on their own logic to gather data, make sense of the data (such as users' habits and preferences), get smarter, and get more people to use the network.
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Once they get a foothold in a market, they become nearly impossible to dislodge. These companies have built platforms than run on an economic logic known as "increasing returns to scale." The more people who use Google, the smarter its systems gets, which means more people use it, which means…This is why we have one Google, one Facebook, one eBay, and so on. Get the inside algorithms right, and you'll become an irresistible magnet.
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These leading-edge multinational companies added another in-depth layer to the U.S.-led international order, further strengthening a system of global interdependence-a system "able to lock in the rest of the world." 5 This world of "locked-in system" wasn't possible without the hard and soft power of the U.S. military as the guarantor of international order. With war weary troops and more limited means, the U.S. military will rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and counterbalance the only potential rival to the U.S.-led international order. In order to deter and win wars, the U.S. military must lead credibly by first looking inward and aligning its vision and culture to the security environment, then looking outward by building a stronger network, and reducing uncertainty to gain an information advantage. Doing so will make the U.S. military the "irresistible magnet" and inspire others to join its global network, thereby promoting stability and prosperity in the region.
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In order to show how the U.S. military can address the challenges of a new era in the Asia-Pacific with rising powers and diffuse technologies, this paper will begin by explaining why the U.S. military must realign its strategy to mitigate the effects of its "wasting assets." The paper will then examine the strategic environment to include the rise of both the "American order" and China and their effects on the international system. The paper will next describe the current U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific.
Following the examination of the strategic environment, the paper will provide a description and analysis of three ways the U.S. military must adapt to align itself to this security environment: 1) realign the vision and culture, 2) build networks by understanding and overcoming the challenges associated with multinational operations and by relationship-building, and 3) reduce uncertainty by gathering and making sense of the data. Lastly, the paper will provide a final analysis on how the U.S. military can remain the guarantor of the "world of locked-in system" built on American values.
Wasting Asset
In the financial world, a "wasting asset" is a fixed asset, such as machinery, that diminishes in value over time. In the early days of the Cold War, "wasting asset" became a common term among U.S. policymakers to describe the U.S. nuclear arsenal after the Soviet Union successfully tested their first atomic bomb in August 1949. 6 A sense of panic ensued upon the realization that the U.S. no longer held a monopoly on nuclear weapons, 7 resulting in the completion of the National Security Council Paper rules and institutions, and democratic community. 13 After the Cold War, the "American order" went global. 14 States choosing globalization and the "American order" joined a "closed system"
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-described by the English geographer Halford Mackinder as a system where nothing could be altered without changing the balance of all. 16 Shifts in distribution of power were followed by balancing acts. While Mackinder feared that one or two states would seek predominance by force, a globally integrated system 4 pressures states to adopt a system-centered approach to strategy rather than a statecentric one. As English naval historian Geoffrey Till describes, "The system reduces the capacity and the incentive for states to take independent action in defense of their interests." 17 In the globalized system, the prohibitive costs of war outweigh the benefits.
Thus, states focus on international security, not just national security in order to preserve the interests of the system as a whole.
With its low barrier to entry and potential large benefits, China discovered how the open market system could yield enormous returns. 18 China's economic engine benefitted its political leadership, fueled its military growth, and perhaps rekindled aspirations of a return to the Middle Kingdom. China's ultimate goal is regional hegemony, and within the domestic political arena, the preservation of the Chinese Communist Party's power. 19 "Comprehensive national power"-a Chinese concept involving the development of its scientific and technical industrial base in order to build up and maximize its military, economic, and political power-is the means with which to attain their goal. 20 To build up its industrial base, China took advantage of the open market system and used scientific and industrial espionage, bribery, and theft of intellectual property. 21 At the same time, China bought foreign companies and traded products to obtain access to technology and information. 22 The political scientist, Aaron
Friedberg, asserts that China's strategy will not require direct confrontation:
Instead, they seek to reassure their neighbors, relying on the attractive force of China's massive economy to counter nascent balancing efforts against it. Following the advice of the ancient military strategist Sun-tzu, Beijing aims to "win without fighting," gradually creating a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile.
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China's increased military strength, more aggressive defense of its territorial claims, and its declaration of the South China Sea as a "core interest" 24 and articulating a compelling vision is the most important strategic leader task. 35 The vision communicates the organizational values to get the "right people on the bus" and provide direction on "where to drive it." 36 More specifically, the vision provides a sense of identity, purpose, and energy shared by every member of an organization, but more importantly, it establishes and communicates the basic, enduring values of the organization. With the rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, the first challenge is creating and communicating a vision to a battle-hardened force that has spent far more time fighting and winning wars than shaping and preventing wars.
Organizational culture refers to "the taken-for-granted values, underlying assumptions, expectations, collective memories, and definitions present in an organization." 37 MIT Professor Edgar Schein's offers an analogy that "culture is to the organization what character is to the individual." 38 Change is constant. The U.S. military must expect to continue operating in an environment requiring speed, adaptability, and innovative ways of thinking and operating. Distinguished by "large degrees of independence and flexibility", the adhocracy culture best aligns with the strategic environment rather than the hierarchy culture of the traditional U.S. Army. 39 Aligning the culture to a non-static environment can be a challenge given the diversity of personnel and different Service cultures and missions. In order to align an organization's culture, leaders must have a methodology for understanding culture.
The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE)
project provides such a methodology. Two of the GLOBE dimensions are of particular relevance in the current and future security environment: power distance and assertiveness. Professors Gerras, Wong, and Allen at the U.S. Army War College explain that "if power distance is high, those in a position of authority expect, and receive obedience-the organization is based on hierarchical decision-making Assertiveness reflects the degree of forcefulness or timidity in people's relationships with others. 42 Leaders and planners must welcome healthy debate and dialogue without retribution. Despite being the "big dog on the block," American leaders must also advocate for and provide allies and partners an appropriate voice in order to maintain unity of effort. As General Wesley Clark wrote of NATO operations during the Kosovo War, "In the American channel there were constant temptations to ignore Allied reservations…" 43 In Good to Great, Jim Collins warns that "there's a huge difference between the opportunity to "have your say" and the opportunity to be heard." 44 Thus, future commanders and staff must not only create an atmosphere of open and candid exchange of ideas, they must actively listen.
In summary, the vision-values and direction-and culture must align to the strategic environment. Speed and adaptability must be valued in order to support an adhocracy culture. The institution must demand and reward innovation and continuous improvement (in oneself, process, and product) in order to build an adhocracy culture.
Innovation is encouraged by not cultivating a zero defect mentality, by allowing mistakes, and making it clear that failure to try is unacceptable. Demanding dialogue and constructive critiques will increase assertiveness and produce low power distance. adapts, and aligns itself to the security environment, the institution must also look externally at the way it will shape, prevent, and fight wars. should not be declined because it enhances the relationship and increases the legitimacy of the operations both domestically and internationally. 53 Multinational operations also bring more forces and offers unique capabilities and perspectives, along with space (land, sea, and air) with which to operate in or from. 54 Finally, multinational operations allow partner states to have a "seat at the table", to share responsibility, and to spread the risk. 55 As the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, operations undertaken by the U.S. military-from humanitarian assistance and disaster response to counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and counter-proliferation operations-will seek a multinational approach as the first and likely best option.
Multinational operations (whether undertaken within the structure of an alliance or a coalition 56 ) come with significant challenges. The main challenge is unity of effort toward common objectives. 57 General Sir Rupert Smith who commanded the U.N.
Protection Force in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, cautions that, "…one must always bear in mind that the glue that holds a coalition together is a common enemy, not a common desired political outcome" 58 and cautioned military leaders to be aware of the political factors behind a multinational operation:
…each national contingent will have been sent for different reasons, and its government and people will have a different balance as to the risks and rewards. Each contingent will have to some degree different equipment, organization, doctrines and training, and each will have a different source of materiel as well as varying social, legal and political support.
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These differences and challenges must be understood as the rebalance to the AsiaPacific is undertaken.
Whereas alliances typically have standardization agreements-with NATO being the gold standard-to enhance interoperability, coalitions do not. 60 Interoperability is more than just technology; it also includes doctrine, procedures, and training. Factors that inhibit interoperability include: national proprietary defense information; time available; differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; experience level; and conflicting personalities. 61 For example, sharing of U.S. classified information to coalition partners continued to be a roadblock during the Libya War because of U.S. security procedures and U.S. participants not understanding the requirement to "classify for releasability." 62 To mitigate these and other challenges, joint doctrine serves as a guide but warns that there is no "standard template" to guide multinational action. 63 With no standard template, two key strategic leader tasksalignment and building trust-best serve military leaders as supplemental guides to achieve unified action 64 and attain strategic objectives.
Alignment entails scanning the environment for relevant societal, international, technological, demographic, and economic developments. 65 In multinational operations, the alignment process must also include environmental scanning of the participating Planning Process, resulting in a revised mission statement, commander's intent, and updated planning guidance. 66 The strategy-the ends, ways, and means-should then be aligned to enact the commander's intent. 67 Without alignment, unity of effort suffers.
While alignment is a key element for success, the foundation for success in multinational operations is trust.
In building trust, personal factors matter. People make a difference and are not interchangeable. 68 As Colonial America's first coalition partner, General Rochambeau made a major difference in building a relationship between the French expeditionary forces and the Continental Army, leading to the coalition's success at the Battle of Yorktown. General Rochambeau's ability to compromise for the sake of the mission and willingness to work with fellow officers were crucial characteristics for successful cooperation with the Americans. 69 General Sir Rupert Smith provides salient advice for today's commanders:
Conduct command on the basis of goodwill to all allies. The moment the corrosive attitudes of mistrust, envy and dislike are loose in the command, its fragile morale is doomed. One's best advocates in the capitals that supplied the troops of the command are their own commanders. 70 But personal factors are not enough. Leaders must also build relationships with partners long before a crisis has started. Building trust also means bringing and sharing enabling capabilities. Partner capacity can be described as a three-legged stool: identifying deficiencies, building capacities, and providing enabling capabilities. 76 The current method of determining U.S. military capabilities is deficient because American military enabling capabilitiesintelligence, command and control, precision weapons, and logistics-are determined by what's necessary to support U.S. operations instead of multinational operations. 77 Because U.S. enabling capabilities will remain in high demand, American strategic leaders should expect to continue contributing enabling capabilities and should consider allies and partners' capabilities in the programming for future capabilities. Affordability could become an issue, but "…it is much more cost effective to prevent conflict than it is to stop one once it has started." 78 One enabling capability, in particular, is often the first one requested in U.S.-supported multinational operations-intelligence. 79 The U.S. intelligence network's "ability to cast a wide net and fuse information" 80 is unmatched in history and decreases the probability of miscalculation, surprise, and wars.
Reduce Uncertainty to Achieve Information Advantage
Clausewitz noted that the element of chance/uncertainty reinforces the fact that war is always a gamble. 81 Clausewitz lived in an era with limited means of gathering data and making sense of it, leading him to write that "most intelligence is false."
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Imperfect information and its associated friction cause uncertainty. As Clausewitz writes, "the difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected." 83 Thus, a commander's intuition must ultimately be relied upon to comprehend the security environment and make effective decisions and "with uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance." 84 Today's U.S. global intelligence network collects and fuses data from a diffuse mixture of sensors across the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains to reduce uncertainty and inform decision-makers and warfighters. The primary objective of intelligence is to provide continual information advantage, measured not in terms of the volume of data but in the value and quality of the intelligence. 85 Information advantage means having enhanced "understanding of the core issue, how it relates to other matters, and possible consequences of alternative courses of action" 86 in order to make better decisions. What intelligence cannot do is guarantee better decisions, but being ill-informed or misinformed will definitely add friction and reduce the likelihood of success. 87 The challenge will be to not only broaden the network's ability to characterize the battleground but shape the future security environment. To do this, the data from the global intelligence network must be discoverable to all analysts and decision-makers in other Services, combatant commands, allies, and coalition partners in order to reduce redundancies and create shared understanding.
Two decades ago former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, testified before the Senate that, "We have slain a dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of." 88 The dragon was the Soviet Union, characterized as "big, slow moving, and predictable" 89 that made intelligence work far easier than today. After years of dedicated focus and development of significant capabilities to monitor a single monolithic threat, the Intelligence Community (IC) realigned its people and network to meet surging requirements in shortened timelines against a multitude of potential threats. Realignment occurred again following 9/11 with a rapid build-up in manpower 90 and intelligence capabilities to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist affiliates. 91 The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific necessitates another realignment in order to shape and prevent wars. have that staring eye over the battlefield 24/7, 365. And I'm pretty certain they're not going to allow that to happen. 92 The pivot will entail more than adjusting the force structure and developing new capabilities and concepts to deter or win an Air-Sea
Battle. The security environment requires a network that can integrate multiple sensor data, eliminate the "chaff from the wheat," and build a "fused mosaic of intelligence" 103 Notwithstanding a reduced defense budget, now is the time to "move out" and seize the opportunity to address emerging security challenges in the Asia-Pacific through aggressive security cooperation initiatives that add "muscle" to the network.
In lock-step with the U.S. State Department's engagement strategy of "forwarddeployed diplomacy", the U.S. military should strengthen the Trans-Pacific network by not taking existing relationships for granted, building new relationships, and connecting more partners to the network. Unlike a wasting asset, a growing network adds value over time. As more states enter the network, the smarter and more resilient the network becomes. Once in the network, there are no "local problems." Problems become shared (as do opportunities and benefits). Based on the "increasing returns to scale" logic, the U.S. military must continue to invest in network building knowing that the investment will pay for itself over time. With a thick networked web, allies and partners can collectively provide regional security and maintain order with potentially less U.S. direct involvement. This scenario of self-reliant, empowered states can be described as "multipolarity within Asia." 107 Lastly, the U.S. military must have clear leadership and vision that recognizes the necessity to adapt and discover opportunities to lock-in the rest of world. As Ramo cautions, "We shouldn't be worrying so much about losing our future to China…but rather about losing our future to our own inability to adjust." 108 
Conclusion
The challenge in the Asia-Pacific is over leadership of the post-World War II international order. As in the Cold War, the U.S. will defend its order and global network but rely less on hard power. Actions taken today-as described in this paper-better prepare the "American order" to handle the challenges of tomorrow. In the competition for influence in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. must seek and take advantage of opportunities to further expand its soft power and continue to build not just an interconnected network but an interdependent network. The U.S. "wins" by leading credibly, further expanding its lead in soft power rankings 109 and further extending its influence in the region. This cycle of increasing U.S. soft power and its corresponding power to influence behavior and shape the environment repeats itself.
China will have three options: co-exist and become a "responsible stakeholder"
within the U.S.-led international order, create its own rival order, or overturn it through a great-power war. The U.S. objective is for China to choose the first option. Ikenberry explains how:
The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system-one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. 110 In victory, U.S. allies and partners shoulder the lion's share of their security burden by relying more on the network of multilateral institutions, rules, and agreements in the collective management of the region's security problems. More states join the U.S.-led world of "locked-in system" not because they have to, but because they want to. And in victory, China also chooses to co-exist as a responsible stakeholder within this system. Endnotes 1 Joshua C. Ramo, "Globalism Goes Backward," Fortune, December 3, 2012, 137. 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 139-140. 4 Ibid., 140.
